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OPENING ADDRESS 
Brendan Whelan 
 
 
WELCOME 
On behalf of the co-hosts, the Economic and Social Research 
Institute and the Foundation for Fiscal Studies, I would like to wish 
you all a warm welcome to this year’s Budget Perspectives Conference. 
These conferences, which have been running since 1998, continue 
to attract a large attendance and have provided a very useful forum 
in which the context surrounding the budget can be analysed and 
debated.  As usual, I should begin by reminding everyone that the 
views expressed are strictly those of the individual authors; neither 
the ESRI nor the FFS takes corporate or institutional positions in 
relation to any of the issues raised. 
 
 In the first presentation, Alan Barrett, Ide Kearney and Yvonne 
McCarthy will present  the macroeconomic context for the Budget, 
drawing on the forecasts and analysis of the latest Quarterly Economic 
Commentary. They will show that the immediate prospects for the 
Irish economy continue to be positive, with growth in both 2006 
and 2007 projected to remain around its long-run potential rate of 
about 5 per cent. As a result, expansion in employment is expected 
to continue and tax revenues to stay buoyant. The authors also 
highlight a number of serious threats and uncertainties, including 
the global imbalances in the world economy, which may unwind to 
Ireland’s disadvantage, the heavy dependence of growth on 
domestic activity, especially in the construction sector, and the on-
going volatility of energy prices. However, on the whole the analysis 
suggests that the Minister will have some scope for flexibility in the 
Budget while staying within the bounds of fiscal prudence. 
The Overall 
Economic 
Situation
 
  Our second presentation, by Brendan Gannon of NUI Galway, 
will examine the growth of disability payments in Ireland. The key 
question she addresses is whether the extent of disability has 
actually increased or whether mis-reporting of disability has been 
spurred by increased generosity of, or accessibility to, disability 
payments. This question is important for a number of reasons, 
including for the assessment of efficiency in public expenditure and 
Disability and 
Disability Benefit 
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because of the distortions which may be introduced into incentives 
for labour market participation. The author sets Ireland in an 
international context, analyses the available evidence and draws 
conclusions for policy. 
 
 The next paper, by Tim Callan, Kieran Coleman, Brian Nolan and 
John Walsh assesses the extent of child poverty in Ireland in an 
international context. They find that countries which have reduced 
child poverty to the lowest levels internationally tend to have a 
strong welfare state supporting the incomes of all citizens, adults 
and children. Analysis of a potential “second-tier” payment in the 
Irish context shows that it is possible to achieve some reductions in 
child poverty through targeted child income supports. However, the 
countries with the strongest focus on such targeted measures still 
have rates of child income poverty which remain quite high by 
international standards. 
Child Poverty and 
Child Income
 
 In the final paper, Tony Fahey of the ESRI and Liam Delaney of 
UCD’s Geary Institute examine the history and nature of state 
support for the horse-racing industry, which currently amounts to 
about €55 million per annum. They show that up to 2001 this 
support was wholly financed by a tax on off-course betting but that 
subsequent reductions in the rates of tax mean that it is now partly 
financed from general taxation. This pattern of state support for the 
horse-racing industry is due for re-consideration in 2008. The 
authors identify the background factors influencing the industry and 
examine the issues which such re-consideration will raise.    
State Support for 
Horse Racing 
 
  We have tried to plan the morning so that there will be time for a 
short period of discussion after each paper as well as a general panel 
session at the end. I hope that the now well established tradition of 
lively participation in these exchanges will continue. 
Final Comment
DISABILITY BENEFIT: 
CONTROLLED OR UNDER-
CONTROLLED? 
Brenda Gannon∗ 
 In recent decades, as many economies endeavoured to reduce the 
numbers unemployed there was a notable increase in the receipt of 
social welfare disability payments. While the case of the Netherlands 
is an outstanding example of this trend, Ireland, among other 
countries, is no exception – official statistics show a steady rise in the 
number of applicants and recipients for disability payments over the 
late 1990s. The credibility of some of these recipients has been 
questioned (Public Accounts Committee (PAC), 2006). The core 
question addressed in this paper is if in fact the incidence of true 
disability has increased, or has mis-reporting of disability been 
spurred on by a perception of generous and easily accessible 
disability payments? The paper will also address the incentives for 
older workers to mis-report – this is of particular policy relevance, 
given the changing demographics of our society and the increasing 
focus on alleviating labour supply deficiencies via the employment of 
older workers. Expenditure on illness and disability amounted to 
approximately 14 per cent of total social welfare spending in 2004, 
over 1 per cent of GDP, so evidence of overpayments of disability 
welfare has some small but important budgetary implications. In 
many countries expenditure on disability payments reflects the rate 
of disability – the crucial question is does this high expenditure lead 
to mis-reporting of disability? If so, reporting behaviour and greater 
control of disability payments is an important concern to policy 
makers. 
1. 
Introduction
One of the main reasons for mis-reporting is the influence of 
economic incentive. If individuals think they could receive generous 
disability payments while out of work, they may be inclined to report 
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a disability. In times of high employment levels, this could possibly 
increase their chances of receiving social welfare. Within the 
economic literature, this is known as endogeneity of reported 
disability whereby individuals may mis-report the extent of a 
disability in order to rationalise labour force non-participation. If 
labour force groups behave in different ways depending on the 
financial incentives involved, this results in ‘systematic differential 
reporting’. Two groups likely to report systematically different to the 
employed, are the disabled/ill and retired.   
To examine the extent of mis-reporting of disability would 
require either an in-depth case study that monitors disability 
payment recipients, or a large scale econometric study that compares 
subjective reported disability to more objective measures of 
disability. Both of these methods have been used in the Netherlands 
and results indicate that there is a significant level of mis-reporting, 
and that this may be reduced by intensive monitoring of recipients. 
In the US and Spain, the main focus has been on comparing 
subjective and objective measures either by using administrative data 
or household survey data. Until recently in Ireland, there has been 
no research on the extent of mis-reporting. However, new evidence 
from a Public Accounts Committee report shows that there are in 
fact overpayments within the disability benefit schemes (2006). This 
small case study is supported by results from a more advanced 
econometric analysis that compares subjective and objective 
disability, (Gannon, 2006). The focus in this paper, therefore, is to 
review the results from these two studies and to discuss these in an 
international comparative context.  
The structure of the remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 
2 provides background data on disability prevalence and expenditure 
in the OECD, and potential reasons for mis-reporting in the context 
of the Irish labour market. Section 3 gives an overview of disability 
schemes in Ireland and the changing number of recipients over the 
years 1995-2004.  Evidence on mis-reporting in Ireland is given in 
Section 4. Results from International studies are compared in 
Section 5. Implications for policy in Ireland are discussed in Section 
6.  Conclusions are presented in Section 7. 
 
 
2.1  PREVALENCE OF DISABILITY IN OECD COUNTRIES 2. 
Background International comparisons of disability benefit expenditure and 
recipients ideally require a standard definition of disability across 
countries. Before assessing the prevalence of disability in various 
countries, we must acknowledge the lack of a common measurement 
of disability, and the fact that a common definition of disability is 
not easily attainable. In recent years, the classification of disability 
has received much attention and focus has shifted from the medical 
model of disability towards the social model of disability (World 
Health Organisation, 1999). The traditional medical form perceived 
individuals with disabilities as having an impairment that did not 
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allow them to partake in mainstream social activities. Such 
individuals were seen as inadequate and society did not 
accommodate them in ways to allow them to be actively included in 
daily societal activities. On the other hand, the social theory of 
disability stresses the discriminatory barriers in society whereby 
modifications should be made to include and accommodate the 
needs of all individuals. Disability is, therefore, an outcome of social 
attitudes/structures and the interaction between the person and 
environmental factors.  
The OECD have well recognised the limitations in comparing 
disability rates between member countries, but have successfully 
presented an overview of disability prevalence in the 1990s (OECD, 
2003). The OECD report used ECHP data from 1997 (see OECD, 
2003, Table 3.1), so in this paper we will update this information 
using the most recently available ECHP data from 2001. The 
definition employed in the OECD report aimed to address the 
World Health Organisation classification of disability, i.e. functional 
limitation or disability caused by a chronic illness or long-term 
impairment. To this end, responses to the self-reported question 
from the ECHP served as a useful starting point in European 
comparisons of disability prevalence. All individual respondents to 
the survey, aged 16 years and over, were asked “do you have any 
chronic physical or mental health problem, illness or disability?” and 
if so, “are you hampered in your daily activities by this chronic 
physical or mental health problem, illness or disability?” Individuals 
had a choice of three responses to this question, (1) “yes, severely” 
(2) “yes, to some extent” or (3) “no, not at all”. Table 1 presents the 
rate of disability for European countries, calculated from the 
responses severely or to some extent limited in daily activities. It 
presents rates for the age group 20-64 years to facilitate comparisons 
with other non-European countries, (see OECD, 2003). In over half 
of these countries, the rate of disability is greater than the European 
or OECD average. In particular, the rates in Sweden and the 
Netherlands are very high, compared to lower rates in more 
southern countries such as Spain or Portugal. The rate for Ireland is 
closer to the average. This table highlights the variation in disability 
rates across countries. Although, cross-country comparisons may be 
affected by survey design or definition of variables, we would not 
expect this to be a huge problem for the European countries in 
Table 1. Consequently, it leaves us to wonder if in fact differences 
across countries reflect variation in the disability welfare system.1  
 
 
 
 
1 In some countries the older age profile may contribute somewhat to a higher disability rate. 
There is also evidence of over-reporting in both Sweden and the Netherlands, (see Johansson 
and Skedinger, (2005) and Kerfhofs and Lindeboom (1995; 2002)). 
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Table 1: Prevalence of Disability, Age 20-64 Years 
 % 
Austria 11.8 
Belgium 11.0 
Canada 16.1 
Denmark 19.1 
France 16.4 
Ireland 12.8 
Italy 5.9 
The Netherlands 21.0 
Poland 14.5 
Portugal 16.2 
Spain 9.9 
Sweden 21.5 
UK 11.1 
US 16.5 
OECD 14.0 
EU 15.5 
Source: ECHP 2001 except for Canada (1998/1999), Poland (2000), US (1999). 
 
 
It is well documented that the prevalence of disability based on 
self-reporting may be biased and endogenous, that is individuals may 
mis-report the extent of their disability in order to rationalise labour 
force non-participation and receipt of disability benefits (Bound, 
1991). Therefore, it is not surprising to note that expenditure on 
disability benefits is highest in those countries with the highest rates 
of disability. Table 2 shows that the variation in disability prevalence 
is similar to that of government expenditure on disability payments. 
For example, in the Netherlands expenditure amounted to 2.6 per 
cent of GDP in 1999, compared to the EU average of 1.5 per cent. 
The percentage of total public social expenditure was 19 per cent, 
whereas the EU average was 11 per cent. Their disability rate was 
also high, over 20 per cent in 2001. More recently, in Ireland, 
expenditure on illness and disability amounted to approximately 14 
per cent of total social welfare spending in 2004, over 1 per cent of 
GDP. The corresponding disability rate was about 13 per cent.  At 
the other extreme, disability expenditure in Italy was less than 1 per 
cent, and only 7 per cent of total social expenditure – the disability 
rate was approximately 6 per cent. 
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Table 2: Disability Prevalence and Expenditure on Disability  
  % With Disability % of GDP % of Total 
Expenditure on 
Social Welfare 
Austria 11.8 1.75 8 
Belgium 11 1.06 7 
Canada 16.1 0.67 7 
Denmark 19.1 2.28 13 
France 16.4 0.83 6 
Ireland 12.8 1.2 14 
Italy 5.9 0.95 7 
The Netherlands 21 2.65 19 
Poland 14.5 3.28 20 
Portugal 16.2 1.03 8 
Spain 9.9 1.24 12 
Sweden 21.5 2.05 15 
UK 11.1 1.27 6 
US 16.5 0.71 10 
OECD 14 1.5 11 
EU 15.5 1.46 11 
 
The expenditure figures mirror the extent of disability across 
countries – countries with high expenditure have higher levels of 
disability. The direction of causation of this relationship is of crucial 
relevance to policy makers – preferably the generosity of payments is 
not causing increased levels of disability reporting. Hence, in Section 
4 we will probe further into this question, and focus in on disability 
reporting in Ireland. First though we look at potential theoretical 
reasons for mis-reporting. 
2.2  POTENTIAL REASONS FOR MIS-REPORTING 
The background to mis-reporting of disability and the relationship to 
labour market outcomes has been well documented in the literature. 
Bound (1991) and Lindeboom and Kerkhofs (2002) set out the main 
types of measurement error involved in estimating the effect of 
disability on labour force participation. First, there may be problems 
with the measurement of the disability variable and lack of 
comparability across individuals may lead to underestimates of the 
effect of disability (via classical measurement error). Second, 
economic (e.g. disability benefit) or psychological incentives may 
affect an individual’s response to questions on disability, leading to 
systematic reporting errors by different groups of individuals within 
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the self-reported measure of disability, i.e. differential measurement 
error.  
Labour market conditions and the structure of the social welfare 
system could well influence the amount of systematic reporting 
behaviour. More specifically, labour force participation changed 
dramatically in Ireland during the 1990s. The numbers in 
employment increased dramatically, and by 2001 there was almost 
full employment, leaving an unemployment rate of 3.6 per cent. For 
those who were still out of work, the eligibility rules for receiving 
unemployment assistance became more stringent, whereby 
unemployed persons must have proved they were actively seeking 
work to ensure continued receipt of unemployment assistance. The 
replacement rate – the ratio of unemployment benefits to after-tax 
wage income – was reduced from a high of 77 per cent to 64 per 
cent in 1994, a level below the OECD average. The Irish welfare 
system traditionally provided “…more or less permanent support for 
the unemployed” with no maximum duration for unemployment 
assistance. In recent years, however, recipients in some age groups 
have been required to register in a public employment or training 
programme if they wish to continue to receive benefits after their 
first six months on the rolls (Tille and Yi, 2001). 
During a cycle of full employment, individuals that do not wish 
to work may be required to seek an alternative explanation for their 
non-participation. Psychological and financial incentives may 
influence them to state that they are unable to work. Perhaps some 
individuals who do not want to work would claim to have a disability 
in order to (1) get disability social welfare assistance, or to (2) justify 
themselves for not working. The extent of these mis-reports could 
vary depending on whether the person is disabled/ill, unemployed or 
retired. Table 3 shows that there are differences in reported disability 
and associated limitations across labour force status categories in 
Ireland. At this stage we do not know if this is true disability or not, 
but none the less this provides a useful starting point to compare 
reported disability across labour force groups. 
Table 3: Labour Force Status by Restrictions in Daily Activities, 1995-2001,  
Age <65 Years 
 
Severe 
Restriction 
Some 
Restriction 
No 
Restriction 
No  
Disability N 
Employed 0.61 4.6 3.3 91.5 19,889 
Unemployed 1.59 9.18 2.75 86.5 2,069 
Disabled/ill 33.1 52.6 4.94 9.35 1,134 
Retired 9.47 23.08 8.28 59.17 845 
Self employed 1.04 6.93 3.76 88.27 2,497 
Other 2.02 9.52 4.22 84.25 14,132 
All 2.33 8.61 3.84 85.22 40,566 
Source: Calculations using Living In Ireland data 1995-2001. 
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For those who are employed there is a high proportion reporting 
no restriction or disability, as expected. Although 5 per cent are 
restricted in some way, we would not expect to see that employed 
workers would mis-report (Kreider, 1999) as there seems little 
incentive for them do so. Unemployed individuals on the other hand 
may be more likely to report a disability and we will need to 
disentangle whether this is true disability or mis-reporting with a 
view to obtaining disability allowance in the future. This may be 
difficult to do – it could be that due to lack of information they are 
claiming unemployment assistance rather than disability allowance, 
or it may be that they prefer to state their labour force status as 
unemployed rather than disabled, to avoid any potential 
discrimination. The disabled/ill group have a large proportion that 
say they are restricted in daily activities, as expected. About 14 per 
cent say that they are not restricted or have no disability. This is 
slightly higher than the figure presented for the Netherlands in 1993, 
where 11 per cent of those aged 58-63 years and in the labour force 
group of disabled, report no restrictions. The corresponding figures 
for the age groups 53-57 years and 43-52 years are 8 and 6 per cent 
respectively (Kerkhofs and Lindeboom, 1995). The 9.5 per cent of 
the labour force group ‘disabled/ill’ with no disability may be 
explained by the fact that their disability may be short term – our 
definition of disability means long-term chronic illness or disability 
only. 
Our hypothesis is that the disabled/ill group may over-report for 
financial and psychological reasons, but this could also be true for 
the retired group. Table 2 shows that almost one third report a 
limitation – we also hypothesise that this group over-reports their 
disability status. The next group are the self-employed and the 
expectation is that they have no incentive to mis-report – about 8 
per cent of them are restricted in some way. Finally, the other group 
include all those on training schemes or not covered by the previous 
categories. While these groups are not the focus of the paper, it will 
be interesting to view their disability reporting behaviour. 
This data clearly indicates different reporting behaviour by labour 
force groups, but the main question is whether this reflects true 
disability or whether economic incentives exist to influence 
differential reporting behaviour. The structure of disability schemes 
will most likely play a role in the reporting behaviour of the 
disabled/ill and retired groups. In the next section, therefore, we 
review some of these schemes. Furthermore, to understand why 
incentives may exist we will look at changes in participation on these 
schemes over the years. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10 BUDGET PERSPECTIVES 2007 
 
 Disability schemes in Ireland are varied depending on whether or 
not the disability/illness is short term or long term, the extent of 
previous social insurance contributions and the cause of disability. 
Figure 1 illustrates a brief description. A report by the Department 
of Social and Family Affairs provides a more in-depth discussion of 
these payments and their historical context, (2003). To summarise 
disability payments may be categorised into short- and long-term 
payments, and entitlements also vary by previous social insurance 
contributions. The amounts received are comparable to 
unemployment assistance/benefit, so in that respect there is no 
incentive to prefer disability benefit. The incentive structure 
therefore lies in accessibility of these payments – if people think that 
disability payments are more readily available than unemployment 
payments, this may influence their disability reporting behaviour. 
Two main types of disability payments exist in Ireland – Disability 
Allowance is a weekly allowance paid to people with a disability who 
are aged 16 years or over and under age 66 years. The disability must 
be expected to last for at least one year and the allowance is subject 
to both a medical suitability and a means test. The Deciding Officer 
may refer an individual for a medical assessment. Disability Benefit is 
a payment made to insured people who are unable to work due to 
illness. For this payment, individuals must attend their own GP to 
get a medical certificate. They may be required to attend a further 
medical assessment within the department of Social Welfare, but this 
is at the discretion of the Deciding Officer. 
3. 
Review of 
Disability 
Schemes in 
Ireland
 
 
Figure 1: Description of Disability Payments in Ireland 
 
 
 
    Short-Term        Long-Term 
 
Injury Benefit                 OCCUPATIONAL INJURY                 Disablement Benefit 
Disability Benefit                                  OTHER DISABILITY            Invalidity Pension 
                                                        PRSI CONTRIBUTIONS 
 
                                                                   NO PRSI CONTRIBUTIONS 
 
         Disability Allowance 
                                  (Disabled Persons Maintenance Allowance, pre 1996) 
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Figure 2 shows that the proportion of the population in receipt 
of the main disability payments increased between 1995 and 2000. 
This could be a reflection of improved access and information to 
social welfare payments for people with disabilities (this could 
include those who were previously employed but now are aware of 
their entitlements). On the other hand, it could be that there has 
been mis-reporting of disability status. The proportions receiving 
benefit fluctuate for all age groups indicating that it is not just 
because individuals are getting more disabilities as they get older, but 
that there are other reasons for the fluctuation in the proportions 
getting these payments. 
Figure 2: Recipients of Disability Payments 1995-2004 
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Similar to the case of individuals who state their labour force 
status as unemployed, those who are near retirement age may also be 
prone to exaggerating their disability status, particularly if financial 
incentives exist. A pre-retirement allowance is available for 
individuals who have been unemployed for over a year and are aged 
55 years and over. The number of people in receipt of this payment 
dropped from about 15,000 in 1994 to approximately 11,000 in 
2004. For those who wish to ‘retire’ at an earlier age or were recently 
employed, social assistance is less available. Individuals must prove 
they are unable to find work, so in this case they may be more 
inclined to report a disability and apply for disability benefits. The 
health and retirement literature has focused on this issue for the US, 
UK and the Netherlands, but until recently there has been no 
comparable analysis for Ireland, possibly because of data limitations.  
If there were changes in monitoring of payments or institutional 
arrangements over the years, we might expect reporting behaviour to 
change. For example, in 1996 the administration of disability 
allowance was transferred to the Department of Social Welfare. 
Table 4 presents some administrative figures to support our proposal 
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that individuals may have changed their reporting behaviour over the 
period. The number of cases referred for medical assessment 
increased from 6,423 in 1997 to 10,285 in the year 2000, and 
consequently the number of applicants deemed as unqualified or 
who did not attend medical examination increased over the years. 
This could be the result of increased surveillance on this social 
welfare payment. It could also suggest that individuals were claiming 
they had a disability in an attempt to receive the Disability 
Allowance. The increasing number of cases referred for examination 
but then not qualifying could support this view. Second, for 
Disability Benefit the number of cases referred for examination also 
increased dramatically from 54,226 in 1995 to 63,927 in 1998. 
Higher proportions were found capable of work after 1998 – ranging 
from 11.8 per cent in 1998 to over 15 per cent after 2000. This 
suggests that individuals may have been over-reporting their 
disability status.  
Table 4: Percentage of Unqualified and Non-attendance to Medical Examinations 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Disability 
Allowance 
          
Cases referred 
for examination N/A N/A 6,423 7,229 8,862 10,285 9,663 8,952 8,450 NA 
Percentage 
Unqualified N/A N/A 28 32 30 28 31 31 32 NA 
Percentage 
Non-
attendance N/A N/A 25 26 27 33 32 30 27 NA 
           
Disability 
Benefit           
Cases referred 
for examination 54,226 52,059 55,089 63,927 59,224 45,037 41,710 42,017 38,670 35,505 
Percentage 
Capable of 
Work 14.8 12.8 13 11.8 12.5 15.6 15 14 16.6 16.3 
Percentage 
Non-
attendance 29 31.4 30.3 32.0 30.7 27.6 29.8 29.6 31.2 31.1 
Source: Statistical Information on Social Welfare Services, Department of Social, Community and Family Affairs. 
 
These figures imply that it may be of interest to determine if 
changes over time were due to mis-reporting and if this was 
influenced by any administrative or institutional changes in the 
system. So the next section discusses the studies that reveal the 
extent of reporting errors in Ireland. 
 
 Until recently in Ireland, there was no statistical evidence of 
overpayments of social welfare for disabilities. Two reviews have 
now been conducted and we discuss these in turn. The first is the 
Public Accounts Committee report, 2006. This report reviewed a 
pilot initiative of intensive monitoring of disability payments. The 
background to this evolved from a finding that lower back pain cases 
4. 
Evidence of 
Reporting Errors 
in Ireland
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represented 17 per cent of all disability benefit claims in 2002. 
Resources were then redirected to a pilot initiative that gave priority 
in medical examinations for these cases. As a result, many cases were 
found to be capable of working and the success of this initiative 
suggested that early intervention may be necessary for other 
ailments. Only 154 of the original 1,532 claimants qualified for 
disability benefit due to lower back pain. In terms of medical 
assessment, this report recommended that reassessment should take 
place – 16 claimants of disability allowance were reassessed in 2003 
and all were found not qualified, but we should bear in mind that 
they may qualify for other illness benefits under the social welfare 
system. For example in 2005, approximately 950 people found 
capable of work did not go back to work but availed of other 
schemes. Of course, some may not have been successful in getting 
employment so this is an issue that needs to be addressed.  
There are two plausible explanations for the large number found 
capable of working, (1) they may have been mis-reporting disability 
or (2) the large proportion found capable may be partially due to the 
backlog of medical examinations so that individuals have recovered 
by the time their medical examination took place. It is likely though 
that people found capable of working, then claimed other social 
welfare benefits – so even though overpayments had been made, the 
overall expenditure saving was minimal. None the less, the 
department of social welfare spends in excess of €23 million each 
year on fees to medical practitioners in respect of certificates and 
medical reports – whereas the total cost of medical assessment is 
about €3.6 million per year – the Public Accounts Committee 
believed that if the department had a process of reviewing 
certificates by GPs, particularly against the opinion of the 
subsequent medical assessments, then money could be saved. 
The second study is an econometric analysis of reporting 
behaviour between 1995 and 2001, (Gannon, 2006).2 The main 
question asked in that paper was “…does reported disability status 
depend on your labour force status”, i.e. was there state dependent 
reporting behaviour? The model employed in that paper compared 
subjective and objective measures of disability for each labour force 
status group, and any remaining effect of labour force status on 
reported disability (compared to the employed) was taken as 
evidence of state dependent mis-reporting. In other words, some 
financial incentives existed to influence individuals to report having a 
disability in order to rationalise their labour force status. In 
particular, the study found that compared to employed persons, mis-
reporting was clearly visible for those whose labour force status was 
disabled/ill or retired.  
The model is similar to that used by Kerfhofs and Lindeboom 
(1995). In their later paper (2002) however, they emphasised the 
2 Readers are referred to Gannon (2006) for a detailed account of the model. 
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importance of correcting for the fact that there may be unobserved 
individual characteristics such as previous investments in health or 
education that could influence labour force status and reported or 
true disability. Due to unobserved differences that exist between 
workers and disability recipients, they found that the extent of over-
reporting was less than previous. Similar to Lindeboom and 
Kerkhofs (2002), we allow for the influence of unobserved effects 
that may be correlated with the objective measure of disability and 
labour force status and find the same effect – the level of mis-
reporting is smaller. 
The results from this model are shown in Figure A1 and this 
compares the level of actual reported disability with predicted 
disability as if employed, for each labour force status group. This is 
described separately for each of the four levels of disability status.  
First, for the disabled/ill group under 30 per cent report having a 
severely limiting disability. When we predict how they would 
respond if they were employed, we find that only approximately 3 
per cent would report this type of disability. But unobserved 
individual characteristics should be accounted for, so we then find 
that about 15 per cent of the disabled/ill group would report a 
severely limiting disability. In other words, half of the original group 
would not report this limitation if responding as if employed. About 
55 per cent report some limitation, and this would reduce to about 
20 per cent when compared to the employed. So if the disabled/ill 
group are over-reporting severe or some limitations, it must be that 
they under-report no limitations or no disability. Indeed, the 
remaining two graphs show that over 4 per cent actually reported no 
limitations, when in fact almost double that would report in that 
manner if employed. The main difference, however, is for reporting 
of no disability – only 10 per cent report having no disability, but 
this increases to over 50 per cent when we account for measurement 
error relative to the employed. This graph clearly indicates that the 
disabled/ill group report severe or some limitations and under-
report having no disability. 
Similar to the case of individuals who state their labour force 
status as disabled/ill or unemployed, those who are near retirement 
age may also be prone to over-reporting their disability status. The 
model finds that the early retired group are prone to mis-reporting 
their disability status. This is evident from Figure A1 that shows 
about 10 per cent report severe limitations and this reduces to under 
5 per cent when compared to the employed. The extent of mis-
reporting of some limitations is similar – approximately 20 per cent 
report this level of disability, but only about 10 per cent are found to 
report this if employed. It is interesting to note also that unobserved 
effects do not play a huge role in this mis-reporting – this is an 
important finding indicating that the retired group are an easier 
target group for the elimination of reporting errors. In other words 
the reason for mis-reporting is purely financial and observed. There 
is also a small element of mis-reporting of no limitations – about 1 
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per cent report this type of disability compared to about 0.6 per cent 
if employed. Initially, we see that 60 per cent of the retired group 
report no disability and this increases to about 80 per cent if 
reporting as employed.  
In order to get some conclusive evidence on the extent of mis-
reporting of disability in Ireland, we should compare these results to 
the first study reported by the Public Accounts Committee and 
administrative data presented earlier in Table 4. First, for disability 
allowance if all those found unqualified or did not attend their 
assessment were actually mis-reporting disability, then the 
econometric result is consistent with administrative data i.e. 50 per 
cent do not report correctly. None the less, it is likely that some 
proportion is not mis-reporting and had recovered during the 
waiting time for assessment, so the econometric estimate may be 
higher than the actual level of mis-reporting. Similarly, for disability 
benefit, 40-45 per cent were found capable of work or non-
attendance. Conversely, the model predicts disability reporting 
compared to the employed, so if the employed were less likely to 
report a (true) disability, then the econometric estimate would 
actually be underestimated. As pointed out by Kerkhofs and 
Lindeboom (1995), in their model they do not need to determine 
who tells the truth – the overall aim is to get measure of disability 
that is cleansed of state-dependent reporting error. In this context, 
we must take into account other evidence in order to get a more 
absolute measure of mis-reporting, for example evidence of 
overpayments from the PAC report. Another reason that may lead 
us to suspect that the econometric figure is underestimated is that 
only approximately 10 per cent of those with back pain who were 
assessed were found incapable of working. There is still a question 
though if people with back pain are mis-reporting or not, but in 
Canada, Campoleiti (2006) found that more stringent screening of 
applications for disability insurance is associated with a decline in 
reports of back pain. While 90 per cent mis-reporting seems very 
high, an approximate level of 50 per cent seems more reasonable, 
but this would depend on the severity of the illness, length of 
waiting times for medical assessment and the type of illness 
involved. Finally, although some of the administrative data suggests 
that there may have been changes in reporting behaviour over time, 
the evidence from this study shows that there were only marginal 
changes in state dependent reporting between 1995 and 2001.  
 
 The findings from our study are quite similar to those found by 
Kerfhofs and Lindeboom (1995, 2002). In their 1995 paper they 
assess the magnitude of mis-reporting of self assessed health and 
find that about three-quarters of all individuals who state their 
labour force group as disabled/ill would not report bad or to some 
extent bad health, if they responded as employed. Although we 
measure mis-reporting of a slightly different variable, i.e. self 
5. 
 International 
Comparisons of 
Mis-reporting
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reported limitations, we find that about the same proportion of the 
disabled/ill labour force group would not report a severe or to some 
extent limiting disability/chronic illness, if responding as if 
employed. When we introduce unobserved effects into the model 
and control for the fact that mis-reporting may be due to some 
unobserved individual characteristics such as previous investments 
in health or education, we find the same result as Lindeboom and 
Kerkhofs (2002). These results are even more comparable because 
they focus on work limiting disability in their 2002 paper. Both 
models find that approximately 60 per cent of the disabled group 
over-report having a severe or to some extent limiting disability. This 
reduces the proportions in similar magnitudes, so the differences in 
the prevalence of disability across countries remain the same. If we 
suspect that differences in disability rates across countries are due to 
the presence of different social security systems, then we would 
expect that in the Netherlands there should be more mis-reporting 
than in Ireland. However, we have only discussed the differences 
within the disabled/ill group and we would need exact figures of 
actual reported disability across each labour force group, to precisely 
calculate differences across countries in the overall rate of reported 
disability. 
Our findings for the retired group are different to those from the 
Netherlands – we find that there is substantial mis-reporting among 
the retired. About one-fifth of those who report a disability would 
do so if they were employed. In the Netherlands, however, the level 
of reporting for the early retired group is quite similar to that of the 
employed. It is possible that differences in mis-reporting between 
the retired and disabled group arise in the Netherlands, because of 
different economic incentives for each group. Early retirement 
schemes were very popular in the 1980s and 1990s in the 
Netherlands as a means of encouraging people to leave the 
workforce to make room for a younger workforce. This means that 
older workers would not need to mis-report a disability in order to 
leave the workforce, as the direct retirement route was clearly 
possible. Given the changing demographics this is no longer 
necessary and the Dutch social partners have agreed that incentives 
for early retirement need to be reduced. Early retirement schemes 
are slowly being replaced by pre-pension arrangements shifting the 
burden of the cost from employers to the individual worker making 
the decision. Still, the OECD (2003) has reported that more needs to 
be done to reduce the incentives for early retirement. This may have 
implications for future mis-reporting of disability. In Ireland 
however, the incentives are similar for everyone up to age 66 years, 
so perhaps the retired group are simply a subset of the disabled/ill 
groups in terms of their reporting behaviour. Unless we analyse a 
harmonised dataset, we cannot precisely compare across different 
labour force groups, and even at that cultural and social norms will 
play a significant role in responses to similar questions. Kapteyn et al. 
(2004) found that for the same level of actual work disability, Dutch 
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respondents have a lower response threshold in claiming disability 
than American respondents. Their evidence shows that especially in 
the more subjective health problems of pain and emotion, 
Americans use a tougher standard when assigning work disability 
status. Why these differences exist is another question, to some 
extent it may be due to differences in social welfare and/or social 
norms. 
Once the evidence of mis-reporting is established, the next step 
in terms of policy is to try and reduce this reporting behaviour. In 
the Netherlands, this proved to be a difficult task and after many 
policy changes and pilot initiatives, the final outcome was to reduce 
the number of fraudulent disability insurance applications. In the 
Netherlands, around 10 per cent of the working age population were 
collecting benefits in the early 1990s. A major reform of the 
disability insurance scheme took place in 1993/1994 but there was 
no sustainable reduction in the numbers entering the scheme. Some 
of this may be attributed to a buoyant labour market whereby lower 
unemployment levels mean that individuals are more likely to aim 
for disability insurance schemes. In addition, they are less likely to 
loose their job when labour market conditions are good. More 
stringent measures were introduced in 2002 mainly because of 
institutional improvements3 and for the first time in seven years the 
total number of beneficiaries declined. Some of this decline may be 
cyclical (the Dutch economy was in a period of recession and inflow 
to unemployment insurance increased) but recent research shows 
that in fact intensified screening of sickness absence also reduces the 
number of disability insurance applications, (de Jong, Lindeboom 
and van der Klaauw (2006)). The current challenges facing the 
Netherlands now are to reassess the stock of existing beneficiaries, 
restrict full benefits to severe cases, and reduce access to partial 
benefits from people with mild disabilities that do not affect their 
daily functioning and work ability. 
In Spain, Jiminez-Martin et al. (2006) found that individuals aged 
between 55 and 59 years had a probability of receiving a benefit 
without deserving it, that was significantly higher than the rest of the 
individuals. Their results confirm that disability benefits are being 
used as a way of exiting the labour force before retirement age. 
While they do not specifically analyse the award errors for people 
aged less than 55 years, it is likely that this may also be a problem in 
Spain. One of the main sources of income for disabled persons is 
disability benefits, approximately 35 per cent receive benefits 
compared to an EU average of about 20 per cent, (OECD, 2003). 
Jiminez-Martin et al. (2006) make some recommendations for more 
medical tests but recognise the expenditure involved. But as we saw 
earlier the costs are likely to only be a small fraction of the benefits 
3 Stricter obligations on re-integration came into force in 2002 for employees on long-term 
sickness benefits. The five disability benefit agencies were merged reducing the influence of 
sector interests on the disability benefit authority. Penalties for firms became stronger. 
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(Netherlands). More recently, the Spanish Observatory of the Social 
Security System proposed reforms in the regulation of permanent 
disability benefits. These included approval of a list of occupational 
diseases and the exclusion of professions that are no longer suited to 
old-aged workers. In relation to this, they propose to modify 
retirement benefits by relaxing the restrictions on age for these 
professions. 
In the US, Gruber (2000) notes that the level of disability 
insurance is 42 per cent of previous earnings on average and mostly 
non-taxable. The author fears that this could be subsidising early 
retirement of older workers who have no other reason for retiring. 
Nonetheless, a replacement rate of 42 per cent is quite low 
compared to the Netherlands, and this could be a contributing factor 
to the higher rates of disability in the Netherlands compared to the 
US. There is also evidence of mis-reporting of disability status 
among older workers, although there are conflicting results between 
earlier and more recent studies. Kreider (1999) found that non- 
workers over-report work limitations. Their main focus was on the 
consequential econometric issues involved in labour force 
participation models, rather than the relationship between reporting 
and social security benefits for disabled people. Bound (1989) found 
that they were no dis-incentive effects of disability benefit – most 
people on disability insurance were found to be healthy and half of 
those who had been rejected for disability insurance were then found 
capable of work. This would suggest that in the US the level of 
benefits does not contribute to mis-reporting but more so that it is a 
favourable route towards retirement. Benitez et al. (2004) analysed 
the 45-64 year age group during the 1992-93 period and found that a 
person’s evaluation of health is similar to Social Security Award 
evaluation. Given that expenditure on disability benefits in the US is 
quite low at less than 1 per cent of GDP, and the fact that the 
disability rate is quite low, we should not expect a high level of mis-
reporting. Kreider (1999) and Benitez-Silva et al. (2004) give 
conflicting results but the earlier paper by Kreider only focuses on 
1992/93 whereas Benitez-Silva et al., focus on data up to 1996 – it is 
possible that the different results are due to cyclical variation. 
 
 There is clearly evidence of mis-reporting of disability and 
overpayments of disability welfare in Ireland, so the next step is to 
find a strategy that will fix this problem. The question is what type of 
policy reform is needed and to what extent this should be 
monitored. Policy reform, in terms of eligibility conditions, does not 
seem to be enough according to evidence from the Netherlands. The 
same level of mis-reporting can be observed in Ireland even though 
there was not much reform. In Ireland, the disability schemes are 
targeted towards a diverse group depending on severity and duration 
of illness/disability and there was little reform in terms of disability 
policy during the period 1995-2001. Benefits increased in line with 
6. 
Implications for 
Policy in Ireland
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other social welfare payments and there were very few institutional 
changes.  
In 1996 the payment of disability allowance was moved from the 
Department of Health to Social Community and Family Affairs. The 
purpose of this was to integrate income maintenance payments and 
to streamline the process for social welfare payments for the disabled 
more generally. The expectation was that this might reduce the level 
of potential overpayments within the system, nonetheless as we saw 
earlier the number of beneficiaries increased significantly but at the 
same time the level of mis-reporting only changed marginally. In 
2003, a report from the Department of Social Community and 
Family Affairs reviewed expenditure on illness and disability 
schemes. One of their main recommendations was to improve the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the system by introducing a simpler 
one. But more recently, the PAC reported on the level of 
overpayments within the system. The PAC report recognised the 
level of work that has been done to eliminate overpayments in the 
social welfare system but recommended that the Department of 
Social Welfare should introduce further systems of integration with 
the Revenue Commissioners in order to streamline systems and 
reduce time taken to detect overpayments. There should also be 
greater liaison between GPs certificates and medical assessments 
from the Department. While the level of overpayments may then be 
reduced it is likely however that individuals no longer entitled to 
disability payments will seek payment from another social welfare 
scheme – thus it is important that policy also ensures that individuals 
are re-integrated in to the labour market once they are capable of 
working. 
The implications from the more stringent measures in the 
Netherlands and the pilot initiative in Ireland are that this is a 
successful approach to reducing overpayments of disability welfare 
and ensuring that the appropriate people receive benefits. A cost-
benefit analysis by de Jong et al. (2006), shows that the costs of 
intensified screening are only a small fraction of the benefits. There 
is a strong case, therefore, for a similar cost-benefit analysis to be 
carried out in Ireland and additionally for a nationwide expansion of 
the pilot initiative. The lesson to be learned from the Netherlands is 
that reform of the schemes is not sufficient without effective 
monitoring. It is crucial, however, that reform does not affect those 
who are currently receiving disability payments if they are genuinely 
in need of assistance. An efficient monitoring system should 
appropriately distinguish between those in genuine need of social 
welfare and those who are mis-reporting or no longer incapable of 
work. 
 
 As disability prevalence increased in many OECD countries, this 
raised the question if in fact the incidence of true disability increased 
or was there an element of mis-reporting? It could be that financial 
7. 
Conclusion
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incentives existed to influence individuals to mis-report. This paper 
strived to answer this question using evidence from a recent Public 
Accounts Committee report and results from an econometric 
analysis of mis-reporting. The conclusion reached is that relative to 
the employed there was substantial mis-reporting in the late 1990s. 
Within the disabled/ill group almost 30 per cent had reported a 
severe disability, whereas this was reduced to approximately 15 per 
cent if individuals in this group would have responded as if 
employed. Similarly, the level of mis-reporting by the early retired 
group was reduced by half. These results are complemented by 
evidence from the PAC report that there was a substantial amount 
of overpayments in all social welfare in 2003, one-third of which 
were attributed to fraud. Some overpayments were due to the time 
lag in obtaining medical assessments, whereby some individuals had 
recovered and were then found capable of working. In this context, 
part of the econometric estimate may reflect mis-reporting due to 
this delay in medical assessment, rather than fraudulent mis-
reporting.  
These results are not unique to Ireland and this paper provided a 
comparative analysis with some other OECD countries. In terms of 
policy, the most effective strategy for reducing mis-reports is for 
careful monitoring of the disability benefit applicants. Evidence from 
the Netherlands suggests that this is a successful and inexpensive 
approach, and without effective monitoring, policy reform is not 
enough to reduce the number of overpayments of disability benefit. 
In an international context, these findings of overpayments are 
comparable to the Netherlands, Spain and the US.  The resulting 
question is; what type of policy reform is required to address this 
problem of overpayments of disability welfare? For example, in the 
Netherlands, policy reform without efficient monitoring did not lead 
to a change in reporting behaviour. Eventually, when stricter 
obligations and penalties for firms were introduced, the number of 
beneficiaries declined. It is crucial the solution does not affect those 
in genuine need of disability benefits. The emphasis should, 
therefore, be on improved medical assessments with shorter waiting 
times and efficient monitoring. In terms of government expenditure, 
international research has shown that the cost of monitoring is only 
a small fraction of benefits. 
The implications for Ireland are: 
 A need for review of the medical assessment procedure in order 
to reduce waiting times, and to reduce expenditure on medical 
practitioners. 
 Introduce further systems of integration between Department of 
Social Welfare and Revenue Commissioners in order to reduce 
time taken to detect overpayments. 
 Cost-benefit analysis of intensified screening should be carried 
out. 
 Effective monitoring of disability benefits is required, perhaps 
by making the pilot initiative a nationwide policy. 
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 Individuals found capable of work need to be re-integrated into 
the labour force, so as to reduce the number applying for other 
social welfare payments. 
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Figure A1  Actual v Predicted Probabilities –average of 1995-2001 
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CHILD POVERTY AND 
CHILD INCOME 
SUPPORTS: IRELAND IN 
COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVE 
Tim Callan, Kieran Coleman, Brian Nolan, John R. Walsh 
 NESC’s (2005) characterisation of the developmental welfare 
state emphasises three overlapping areas of welfare state activity: 
services, income supports and activist or innovative measures. In 
this paper we focus on the income support domain, especially as it 
relates to children.  
1. 
Introduction
There has been particular concern in Ireland, as in many other 
countries, about the effects of poverty on children. The impact of 
poverty during childhood, and especially in early childhood, may be 
especially difficult to reverse. For this reason, a key question is how 
policies can be made more effective in supporting the incomes of 
families with children. In order to explore this question we examine 
evidence on how child poverty rates vary across a wide range of 
countries and the role of policy differences in helping to explain 
these differences in outcomes for children. We then focus more 
closely on the Irish system of child-related income supports. We 
examine how it has evolved in recent years, and the impact of such 
changes on child poverty. The implications of introducing a “second 
tier” of income-tested child income support, replacing Child 
Dependant Additions and Family Income Supplement, are then 
examined. Such a change has been under consideration as part of the 
Ending Child Poverty Initiative under Sustaining Progress and remains 
on the agenda in the most recent partnership agreement, Towards 
2016. 
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2.1 CHILD POVERTY IN INTERNATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVE 
2. 
Child Poverty 
and Welfare 
Policies: Cross-
country 
Comparisons
The most comprehensive recent study of rates of child poverty in 
rich countries is reported in UNICEF (2005). Overall results for 
child income poverty (the risk of living in a household with an 
income below 50 per cent of median income per adult equivalent) 
are reported in Table 1. The lowest rates of child poverty were 
found in the Scandinavian countries, where the risk of income 
poverty was between 2 and 4 per cent. Almost all Continental 
European countries, along with some of the new member states, had 
child poverty rates of between 7 and 13 per cent. Ten countries had 
higher child poverty rates – the highest in the US and in Mexico, 
with the others at levels of between 14 and 17 per cent. It is striking 
that all of the English speaking countries had poverty rates well 
above the average. The six English speaking countries occupied six 
of the nine worst positions in terms of the prevalence of child 
poverty. Micklewright (2004) extends this analysis with further 
comparisons and finds that the English-speaking countries also 
perform poorly on other indicators of child welfare.  
Table 1: Rates of Income Poverty for Children in Rich Countries, Around 2000 
Country 
  
Rate of Child Poverty 
(Relative Income Poverty, 50% of Median Equivalised Income)
 
Denmark 2.4 
Finland 2.8 
Norway 3.4 
Sweden 4.2 
Czech Republic 6.8 
Switzerland 6.8 
France 7.5 
Belgium 7.7 
Hungary 8.8 
Luxembourg 9.1 
Netherlands 9.8 
Austria 10.2 
Germany 10.2 
Greece 12.4 
Poland 12.7 
Spain 13.3 
Japan 14.3 
Australia 14.7 
Canada 14.9 
UK 15.4 
Portugal 15.6 
Ireland 15.7 
New Zealand 16.3 
Italy 16.6 
USA 21.9 
Mexico 27.7 
Source: UNICEF (2005), Child Poverty in Rich Countries 2005, Innocenti Report Card No. 6.  
Note: The poverty rates in Figure 1 refer to the following years: 2001 (Switzerland, France, Germany, 
New Zealand), 2000 (Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Czech Republic, Luxembourg, Japan, Australia, 
Canada, Portugal, Ireland, Italy, USA), 1999 (Hungary, Netherlands, Greece, Poland, UK), 1998 (Mexico), 
1997 (Belgium, Austria) and 1995 (Spain). 
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More recent information on the incidence of child and overall 
poverty is available for EU countries. This is of particular relevance 
given the emphasis on trying to match EU best practice in social 
policy, as set out in the Lisbon strategy. Table 2 reports “at risk of 
poverty” measures for the total population and for children, for EU 
countries in 2004. The cut-off used is 60 per cent of median income 
per adult equivalent, one of the key “Laeken” indicators. 
Table 2: At Risk of Poverty Rates for EU15 Countries, 2004 
              (Cut-off point: 60 Per Cent of Median Income Per Adult 
Equivalent) 
Country Total Rate Child Rate  
Norway 11 8  
Denmark 11 9  
Finland 11 10  
Sweden 11 11  
Luxembourg 11 18   
Netherlands 12  18  
Austria 13  15  
France 14 14  
Belgium 15 17  
Germany 16 20   
UK 18 22  
Italy 19  26  
Greece 20 20  
Spain 20 24  
Ireland 21 22   
Portugal 21  23  
Unweighted average of EU15 16 18  
Note: Figures for Netherlands and for the UK are for 2003. 
Source: Eurostat web site, http://www.epp.eurostat.cec.int. 
 
The Scandinavian countries had the lowest rates of overall 
income poverty, and rates of child poverty which were, if anything, 
somewhat lower (child poverty rates of 8 to 11 per cent). This makes 
them stand out from Continental European countries where the 
child poverty rates were between 14 and 20 per cent. The UK and 
Ireland had child poverty rates of 22 per cent, with higher rates of 
up to 26 per cent in a group of “southern” countries (Portugal, 
Spain and Italy). 
For the most part, child poverty rates were close to overall 
poverty rates.1 Norway, Denmark and Finland were the only 
countries with child poverty rates below the overall poverty rate. 
There were two countries, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, with 
low overall poverty rates but substantially higher child poverty rates. 
 
1 This is in line with Brady’s (2004) finding that, for 18 rich Western countries, child 
poverty is very strongly correlated with overall poverty. Brady finds, on the other 
hand, that elderly poverty is only moderately correlated with overall poverty. 
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2.2 CHILD POVERTY AND CHILD INCOME SUPPORT 
POLICIES 
The lowest rates of child poverty and of overall poverty shown in 
Table 2 are for the Nordic countries – Denmark, Finland and 
Sweden among the EU countries, and Norway. The logic of the 
“best practice” approach dictates that special attention should be 
paid to these countries in order to understand how they have 
achieved low rates of child and general poverty, and what lessons 
may be learned from their experience. This is all the more so 
because the child poverty outcomes for children achieved in theses 
countries represent “best practice” not just within the EU but in 
global terms. In seeking to “end child poverty” a closer look at the 
Scandinavian experience is clearly warranted. 
We begin by considering how income support paid by the state 
in respect of children varies across countries: clearly this has the 
potential to affect child poverty outcomes. Child income supports 
can vary according to the age and number of the children concerned, 
and may also depend on whether one or two parents are present in 
the household, and on the labour force status and income of the 
parent(s). Bradshaw and Finch (2002) examine child income support 
packages for a wide range of family types and labour market/income 
situations. They choose a subset of these cases, giving greater weight 
to those occurring more commonly. While this does not provide a 
fully representative picture of families in any one country, this 
approach provides a standardised framework with which to assess 
the nature of the income support packages across countries. Key 
results are set out in Table 3. 
Table 3:  Ranking of the Child Support Package for 22 Countries, 2001 
Country 
Value of Cash Child Income 
Supports as % of Average 
Wage Country 
Value of Child Income Support Package 
Including Housing and Non-cash Services
as % of Average Wage 
Austria  16.3 Austria 17.2 
Luxembourg  14.2 Finland 13.9 
IRELAND 13.2 France 10.9 
Belgium  12.1 Luxembourg 10.2 
UK  11.6 Sweden 10.2 
France  10.4 Norway 9.7 
Norway  9.6 Belgium 9 
Germany  9 Germany 8.3 
Finland  8.7 Denmark 7.7 
USA  8.5 UK 7.5 
Australia  7.6 Australia 6.7 
Israel  7.3 IRELAND 5.3 
Sweden  6.7 Israel 3.9 
Portugal  6.6 Canada 2 
Denmark  6.2 Italy 2 
Canada  5.8 USA 1.6 
New Zealand  5.2 New Zealand -0.4 
Japan  4.9 Spain -1.1 
Italy  4.8 Japan -1.5 
Spain  2.3 Portugal -2 
Greece  1.9 Greece -5.6 
Source: Bradshaw and Finch (2002). Figures for Ireland incorporate revisions 
(http://www.york.ac.uk/inst/spru/research/summs/childben22.htm). 
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The package of cash income supports offered in Ireland, as of 
2001, was among the most generous across countries. Ireland ranked 
third in terms of the value of the cash package of income supports 
for children – mainly child benefit and child dependant additions. 
The total value of the package, averaged over a wide range of family 
situations, was just over 13 per cent of the average industrial wage, 
compared with 15 per cent for the country with the most generous 
package.  The value of the package in most countries – including the 
four Scandinavian countries – was between 5 and 10 per cent of the 
average wage.  
The value of Ireland’s overall child support package, taking into 
account housing benefits and provision of non-cash services such as 
subsidised childcare, was towards the lower end of the international 
spectrum in 2001. Increases in child benefit since then, and the 
introduction of the Early Childcare Subsidy will have boosted 
Ireland’s overall child support package, and its position in the 
country rankings of child supports. Because this support is delivered 
through a cash mechanism, while other countries typically use non-
cash mechanisms for childcare, Ireland’s position in the ranking of 
cash income supports will be further enhanced, while its low ranking 
in terms of directly provided services will remain unchanged. 
It is striking that the four Scandinavian countries, which have the 
lowest child poverty rates, had child income support packages of 
between 6 and 10 per cent, in the middle of the international 
ranking.  Thus, their exceptional performance in terms of reducing 
child poverty is not due to exceptionally high child income supports. 
Indeed, both Ireland and the UK have higher valued cash supports – 
but as we have seen, child poverty rates in Ireland and the UK are 
close to the highest in the EU, while those in the Scandinavian 
countries are among the lowest. 
2.3 WELFARE REGIMES 
How then have the Scandinavian countries managed to achieve such 
low rates of child poverty? A key factor in explaining this is that the 
income situation of children depends on the total income package 
received by their parents, not just on the elements which are related 
to the presence of children. The Scandinavian societies combine 
high employment rates with a welfare regime which gives high levels 
of payment to those on social protection. Table 4 below illustrates 
for Ireland, the UK and the four Scandinavian countries:2 
a. the unemployment benefit paid to a single person as a 
proportion of the EU at risk of poverty threshold (60 per 
cent of median income per adult equivalent); 
2 While individual examples of this type might not be representative we know (e.g., 
from Callan and Nolan, 2004) that an analysis taking into account the full range of 
welfare recipients points in a similar direction. Callan and Nolan show that over half 
of the gap between the overall poverty rate in Ireland and that in Denmark can be 
accounted for by differences in welfare policies. 
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b. the poverty threshold as a proportion of the average 
industrial wage; and 
c. unemployment benefit as a proportion of the average 
industrial wage. 
Table 4: Poverty Thresholds, Average Wages and Unemployment Benefits, 2004 
  
Unemployment Benefit 
 as % of Poverty 
 Threshold 
Poverty Threshold 
 as % of Average Wage of 
Production Worker 
UB as % of Average 
 Wage of Production 
Worker 
Denmark 147 29 43 
Finland 121 34 41 
Sweden 89 37 33 
Norway1 70 42 29 
Ireland 65 39 26 
UK 40 34 14 
Notes: 1. As UB is earnings related, and can be payable in respect of quite low levels of earnings,  social 
assistance provides a higher floor – similar to the UB payable to an individual on half the average wage. The 
minimum wage in Ireland is just over half the average industrial wage. 
Source: Poverty threshold from Eurostat web site cited in Table 2. Wage for average production worker from 
OECD Taxing Wages 2003-2004. Unemployment benefit for a single person from OECD (2006) Benefits and 
Wages: OECD Indicators 2004 and associated online country files. 
 
In Ireland, the rate of Unemployment Benefit in 2004 was about 
two-thirds of the at-risk-of-poverty threshold for a single person. 
For Sweden the ratio was almost 90 per cent, while the payment 
rates in Finland and Denmark were well above the at-risk-of-poverty 
threshold in those countries. In the UK, by contrast, the payment 
rate was 40 per cent of the at-risk-of-poverty threshold. 
The poverty thresholds represent varying proportions of the 
average industrial wage across countries. Is this ratio particularly 
high in Ireland, causing particular labour market difficulties in paying 
a welfare rate which is high in relation to the at-risk-of-poverty 
threshold? The Irish rate is 39 per cent, higher than that in 
Denmark, Finland and the UK. It is also somewhat above the rate in 
Sweden (37 per cent) but below that in Norway (42 per cent).  
Sapir (2005) provides a further perspective on the issue of 
whether the achievement of a low risk of poverty measure in the 
Scandinavian countries is at the expense of a trade-off between 
equity and efficiency. Figure 1, drawn from Sapir, plots the EU15 
countries in terms of an equity goal (the probability of avoiding 
poverty, measured by 100 minus the percentage risk of poverty 
measure) and an efficiency goal (the employment rate, which takes 
into account not just unemployment but also labour market 
participation). 
Sapir argues that this evidence indicates that the Scandinavian 
economies and welfare regimes are attaining both equity and 
efficiency goals. Ireland and the UK score well on the efficiency 
front, but not on the equity goal. The Continental economies, by 
contrast, score well on equity but not on efficiency; while the 
Mediterranean or southern EU countries, by and large, achieve 
neither efficiency nor equity. 
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Figure 1: Employment Rates and Probability of Avoiding Poverty, 
EU, 2004 
Source: Sapir (2005). 
 
 The clear message from these international comparisons is that, to 
date, the most effective policy regimes in countering both child 
poverty and general poverty have been those of the Scandinavian 
countries. Furthermore, the success in countering child poverty is not 
due to especially high child income support payments, but to the 
more general income support regime and to the extent to which the 
welfare state more broadly reconciles equity and efficiency goals and 
underpins a high employment rate. However, welfare state 
expenditures have to be financed. If Ireland, like other English-
speaking countries, is unwilling to finance expenditure at the levels 
seen in Scandinavian countries, then the question arises as to what 
can be achieved with a more targeted approach to the reduction of 
child income poverty. In this section, therefore, we concentrate on 
the recent evolution of policy in Ireland and in other English 
speaking countries, which relates to the development of more 
targeted child income supports. It must be remembered, however, 
that these supports operate in an environment where child income 
poverty is substantially higher than in the Scandinavian countries. 
3. 
Restructuring 
Child Income 
Supports: Policy 
Impacts, Policy 
Options
3.1 ASSESSING THE IMPACT ON CHILD POVERTY OF 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CHILD INCOME 
SUPPORT 
There have been dramatic shifts in child income support over the 
past decade. Both the level of child income support and the way in 
which it is structured have changed radically in recent years. Since 
the mid-1990s, rates of payment for Child Dependant Additions 
(CDAs) – a payment received only by those in receipt of a weekly 
social welfare payment – have been frozen in nominal terms, while 
very substantial additional resources have been used to increase the 
rate of child benefit paid in respect of all children. The broad 
rationale for this approach involved a shift to child benefit as a form 
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of support which was neutral with respect to labour market status, 
and away from payments conditional on being out of work. 
The outcome in terms of the balance between payment rates for 
CDAs and Child Benefit is illustrated in Figure 2. The rate of 
payment for Child Benefit rose from just under 2 per cent of the 
average industrial wage in 1994 to a level just under 6 per cent of 
that wage in 2005. While CDA payment rates remained constant in 
nominal terms, rising real and nominal wages meant that CDA rates 
declined as a proportion of the average industrial wage from about 5 
per cent in 2000 to 3 per cent in 2005. The total income support 
package rose from 7 per cent of the average wage to 9 per cent, with 
the net increase concentrated in the period from 2000 to 2002. 
Figure 2: Rates of Child Benefit and Child Dependant Addition as a Percentage of 
Average Earnings in Manufacturing, 1994 to 2005 
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Budget 2006 introduced a further innovation in the form of the 
Early Childcare Subsidy. This is a cash support, allowing the parent 
or parents to choose whether to use the money to help purchase 
paid childcare or to use it as a financial support for a parent to 
undertake the care. 
The head count measure of children living in a household “at risk 
of poverty” (i.e., below 60 per cent of median income) was close to 
24 per cent in 2000, as measured by the Living in Ireland Survey. 
Latest estimates, based on the new Survey of Income and Living 
Conditions (SILC) conducted by the Central Statistics Office (CSO), 
are just above 21 per cent. But this fall of 2½ percentage points 
represents the impact of all changes over the period (as well as any 
effect from the change in data source). It includes the influence not 
only of policy changes, but also of all developments in the economy 
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and society over the period – for example, changes in labour market 
participation, or in the incidence of different family types. Within 
the policy domain, it includes the impact of all policies, not just 
those relating to child income support. 
Identifying the impact of changes in child income support 
policies on the risk of income poverty facing children requires an 
alternative approach. We need to hold constant the population, and 
all policies other than child income support. We do this using a 
microsimulation model – SWITCH, the ESRI tax benefit model. 
The impact of child income support policy changes between 2000 
and 2006 is measured by constructing a counterfactual policy for 
2006 in which child income supports are simply indexed in line with 
earnings from their 2000 levels. We can then simulate the impact of 
the child income support policy changes on the 2006 population. 
This analysis suggests that changes in child income supports 
(including the sharp increase in Child Benefit in 2001/2 and the 
Early Childcare Supplement in 2006) led to a reduction of 4.2 
percentage points in the incidence of child income poverty (using 
the 60 per cent median cut-off). This represents a fall of one-fifth in 
the head count measure. The “poverty gap” measure which takes 
account of the depth of income poverty for those experiencing it 
falls rather more, by about one-third, because it also takes into 
account those who are brought closer to but not above the poverty 
threshold. 
3.2 RECENT INTERNATIONAL POLICY 
DEVELOPMENTS 
Policy developments designed to improve in-work incomes relative 
to out-of-work benefits (“making work pay”) have attracted 
considerable attention in OECD countries.3 The long experience of 
the US and the UK in this field, and the fact that much of the 
evidence on the employment and labour supply effects of making 
work pay policies centres on US and UK experience has made policy 
developments in these countries of particular interest. A key feature 
in both countries is an in-work benefit, paid through the income tax 
system – Earned Income Tax Credit in the US, and (after several 
structural changes and renamings) the combination of Child Tax 
Credit and Working Tax Credit in the UK. 
While the development and refinement of these schemes has 
been closely followed, it should be borne in mind that these are still 
two of the countries with the highest rates of child income poverty. 
By contrast, Finland achieves low rates of child and adult poverty 
with a system that provides generous support through social 
insurance; a child benefit rate which is somewhat lower than 
Ireland’s; and  no income-tested child income support. 
3 For a review of “policy transfer” in the welfare area, with a particular focus on 
“making work pay”, see Banks et al. (2005). 
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A brief summary of how the policies evolved on either side of 
the Atlantic may be useful, before considering some of the analysis. 
In the US, the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), initially 
introduced in 1975, has been substantially expanded and revised 
since then. EITC is a refundable tax credit, typically paid annually in 
arrears, and administered by the US tax authorities. The level of the 
credit rises initially with the level of earned income (at a rate of 
about 35 per cent of earnings), then is capped at a maximum level, 
and is then withdrawn in gradual fashion or “phased out” (at a rate 
of about 15 to 20 per cent). While the level of the credit, and its 
aggregate cost, was initially quite low, EITC now forms a substantial 
part of the overall income support programme (costing almost as 
much as Food Stamps and Temporary Assistance to Needy 
Families). 
In the UK, Family Credit was introduced in 1988 (replacing 
Family Income Supplement) has also been expanded and revised in 
later years. The current system involves a Child Tax Credit (CTC) 
and a Working Tax Credit (WTC). The child tax credit comprises 
two elements: 
• a per-family element  (UK£10.45 per week in 2003-4); and 
• a per-child element (About UK£28 per week in 2003-4). 
Families with annual gross incomes below £13,230 are entitled to 
the full credit. Entitlements are then reduced by 37 per cent of 
income above this level until the family is left with just the per-
family element. Incomes above £50,000 per annum reduce 
entitlement to the per family element by 6.7p in the pound until 
entitlement is exhausted. 
The Working Tax Credit operates in parallel. Key parameters 
include:  
• withdrawal of benefit at a rate of 37 per cent, for incomes 
exceeding £5,000; 
• benefits are exhausted for a lone parent or couple working 
full-time at an income of just under £15,000 per annum, or 
£13,230 if working less than 30 hours per week). 
As with EITC, payment of WTC and CTC is now paid through 
the income tax system and operates on an annual basis. Three recent 
reports have detailed problems arising from “overpayment” of 
benefit, in some cases despite recipients’ best efforts to rectify the 
situation. (Parliamentary Ombudsman, 2005; Citizens Advice, 2005, 
House of Commons Treasury Committee. 2005). 
One of the aims of the UK approach has been to “make work 
pay” for parents with low earnings capacity, and thereby increase 
labour market participation and long-term attachment to the labour 
market.  Brewer et al. (2005) estimated that by 2002, the Working 
Family Tax Credit scheme had increased the labour supply of lone 
mothers by around 5 percentage points, with the labour supply of 
mothers in couples being reduced by 0.6 percentage points, and the 
labour supply of fathers in couples raised by about 0.8 percentage 
points. Blundell and Hoynes (2001) compared the US and UK 
experiences. In the US, a large proportion of the dramatic rise in 
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participation among low educated single parents in the 1990s has 
been attributed to the increased generosity of the EITC. But 
estimates suggest that the impact of apparently similar reforms has 
been smaller in the UK. Blundell and Hoynes argue that four factors 
help to account for these differences: 
(a) the impact of interactions with other means-tested benefits 
in the UK; 
(b) the importance of workless couples with children in the UK, 
making up almost 50 per cent of recipients; 
(c) the level of income support given to non-working parents; 
and; 
(d) the strength of the economic upturn in the US during the 
1990s. 
Bargain and Orsini (2006) explore the possible introduction of an 
in-work benefit along the lines of the UK’s Working Tax Credit 
(WTC) to three European countries: France, Germany and Finland. 
One key feature is that there are substantial increases in marginal 
effective tax rates for individuals in low to middle income 
households. Bargain and Orsini’s labour supply analysis finds that 
positive effects on the labour supply of lone parents are outweighed 
by withdrawals from the labour force for some married women, a 
reversal of the balance in the UK case. These results indicate the 
need for careful analysis of such proposals in the context of the 
national labour market and initial situation. 
3.3 POLICY ISSUES 
There are particular reasons for the special focus on child poverty. 
One major concern is that the effects of poverty on children are at a 
vulnerable, formative stage. Poverty may therefore have more long-
lasting and damaging effects than on adults, who may be more 
resilient and escape from poverty with more limited after-effects. 
There are, however, both ethical and practical objections to the 
consolidation of these concerns into an income support structure 
strongly tilted towards the elimination of child poverty at the expense 
of general poverty. For example, if the poverty line for a single adult 
were €200 per week, and the child addition to the income poverty 
line were €66, a “neutral” structure could set welfare payment rates 
to be €200 for a single adult and €66 per child. But if this could not 
be afforded, one interpretation of an emphasis on child poverty 
could result in a payment of, say, €150 for a single adult, €116 for a 
first child and €66 for other children. This would mean that families 
with children were brought up to the poverty line income, whereas 
single adults would remain below the poverty line. 
On the ethical side, one difficulty with such an approach is that 
many of the adults currently experiencing poverty may themselves 
have suffered poverty as children, with consequent damage to their 
later life chances. On the practical side, a structure which guaranteed 
an income above the poverty line for all children, but not for adults, 
would mean that poor childless adults would face a situation in 
which having a child would be a guaranteed route out of income 
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poverty. The extent to which this would affect fertility decisions is 
unclear, but it seems undesirable to face poor individuals with such 
incentives. A further objection might be that no country seems to 
have achieved a low rate of child poverty while having a high rate of 
poverty in the adult population. Given these considerations, we do 
not pursue the theoretical possibility of a income support structure 
strongly biased towards the elimination of child poverty rather than 
general poverty when examining policy options. 
The main child income support instruments at present include 
Child Benefit, Early Childcare Supplement, and Increases for Child 
Dependants (formerly called Child Dependant Additions). We 
consider two possible additions to this structure: an increased, 
taxable child benefit and a child benefit supplement. A refundable 
tax credit in respect of children would be equivalent, in real terms, to 
the current (untaxed) child benefit. It would involve a different 
delivery mechanism but delivery of child benefit is not thought to be 
problematic.  For these reasons, a refundable tax credit for children 
is not considered further here.  
3.3.1  An Increased, Taxable Child Benefit 
One way of achieving greater “targeting” with child benefit would 
be to increase it while making the payment taxable. This would give 
a full payment to those with lowest incomes, a payment reduced by 
20 per cent for those on the standard rate of tax, and reduced by 42 
per cent for those on the top rate of tax. This option was debated 
during the 1990s, and would have had much to recommend it. At a 
time when the basic child benefit payment was being increased so 
rapidly, all those with children would have seen their Child Benefit 
increase despite its being made taxable, but there would have been 
larger net increases for those on lower incomes. This approach was 
not adopted, instead universal child benefit was increased but 
without making it taxable (while CDAs were frozen as we have 
seen). The taxable status of child benefit could have been changed 
more readily at the same time as substantial increases in payment 
levels were introduced. In the absence of substantial further 
increases in child benefit, making the payment taxable would require 
the “clawing back” of some of the net benefit for high earners. 
Making the payment taxable would also affect marginal tax rates and 
how they change as those with children move into the tax net or 
from the standard to the higher tax band. None the less, it remains a 
way of introducing some element of targeting to the payment 
without affecting its essential structure and the way it is paid.  
3.3.2   A Child Benefit Supplement 
A paper prepared for the Tax Strategy Group (Department of Social 
and Family Affairs, 2004) indicated that “…it has been agreed under 
the ‘Ending Child Poverty’ special initiative in Sustaining Progress to 
examine the possibility of combining FIS and CDAs into one 
payment which might be paid to low income families irrespective of 
their employment status.” This idea – a child-related benefit which 
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would depend on income but not on labour market status – is 
currently being explored by the NESC as part of the social 
partnership process. Key factors here include the desire to have an 
income-tested supplement, so as to maximise the impact on child 
poverty for a given level of resources; a seamless transition between 
child income support when out of work and when in employment,  
in order to facilitate those wishing to take up employment; and the 
low rate of  take-up of Family Income Supplement (FIS), the 
existing in-work benefit for families with children. 
What might such a payment look like? One possibility is that it 
could take the form of “…a tapered, employment-neutral Child 
Benefit Supplement”.4 This is the form of unification which is 
examined here. Other possible designs are not excluded, but the 
non-categorical, income-tested Child Benefit Supplement provides a 
clear starting point and benchmark against which other options can 
be compared. 
Here we sketch what such a supplement (CBS) might look like, 
its likely cost and its potential impact on the risk of income poverty, 
on financial incentives to take up employment, Our analysis is based 
on SWITCH, the tax benefit model, which contains all the relevant 
information and can, therefore, calculate each family’s entitlement 
accurately. Implicit in the analysis is that each family has the same 
income for each week of the year. Difficulties arising from problems 
of administration and take-up of such a benefit are discussed later. 
There are three key parameters to be set in such a Child Benefit 
Supplement: 
• the weekly or monthly rate of payment for CBS; 
• the income level up to which a full payment is made; 
• the rate of withdrawal (taper, “phase-out”) applied to the 
benefit as income rises above that limit. 
We set the level of the Supplement at a rate which bridges the 
gap between current child income supports and the “…child 
addition to the at risk of poverty threshold”. Thus, the new 
structure, incorporating CBS, gives a child-related payment which is 
sufficient to cover child-related expenses (30 per cent of the at risk 
of poverty threshold of 60 per cent of median income). In cash 
terms, we estimate that a rate of CBS of €33 per week would be 
needed to bridge this gap – approximately double the rate of the 
most common child dependant addition rate. All child dependant 
addition rates are set to zero, as the logic of the approach is that 
these are replaced by the CBS. 
The situation with respect to replacement of FIS is not so 
straightforward. A key feature of FIS is that it can provide a very 
high level of support for those in employment at low incomes – 
even if there is only one child in the family. The level of additional 
4 The quote is from Combat Poverty Agency (2005), which treats the unification of 
CDAs and FIS as quite distinct from the Child Benefit Supplement option. Our 
approach is to analyse the Child Benefit Supplement as one form of unification of 
CDAs and FIS 
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support in respect of second and higher order children ranges 
between about €12 and €20 per week, similar to the level of support 
provided by Child Dependant Additions. It is not possible for a 
fixed, per-child payment such as a Child Benefit Supplement to 
replicate this structure; and even the addition of a “per family” 
element to the CBS (equivalent to a higher rate for the first child in 
the family) would not fully replicate the structure of support 
provided by FIS.  
This point was recognised in the analysis of the Tax and Welfare 
Working Group in its 1996 report. The approach adopted there was 
to allow for a “residual” FIS scheme to provide this form of income 
support. The success of a Child Benefit Supplement or other such 
scheme in  “migrating” low income working families off FIS could 
then be gauged by the reduction in the numbers of FIS recipients 
and FIS expenditure. Some of the schemes examined by the working 
group resulted in the “residual” FIS scheme becoming very small; 
but, depending on the design of the scheme and the levels of 
payment, FIS could remain a significant feature of the overall 
package. Where any given package lies on this continuum is a matter 
for empirical investigation, using the simulation techniques 
employed here.5 
A CBS set at €33 per week, with an income limit of about €500 
per week and a withdrawal rate of 20 per cent is found to have the 
following “cash” or first-round impact (i.e., before any adjustments 
to behaviour, which may be induced by changes in the budget 
constraints caused by the policy change). First, such a policy change 
is estimated to cost more than €450 million per annum – equivalent 
to the cost of a 20 per cent rise in universal Child Benefit. The direct 
impact of the introduction of a CBS on this scale is estimated as 
reducing child income poverty (at 60 per cent of median income) by 
almost 4½ percentage points. Expenditure on FIS would be reduced 
by about one-third, leaving a substantial residual FIS scheme in 
place. 
How is this improvement in poverty reduction impact achieved? 
One key difference with respect to the existing structure is that it is 
assumed that the new Child Benefit Supplement is paid to all those 
who qualify, and only to those who qualify. Thus, it is assumed that 
the Child Benefit Supplement does not experience the problems 
with take-up which have dogged the Family Income Supplement 
scheme On the other hand, there is also an implicit assumption that 
the new benefit will be given only to those who are entitled to 
 
5 The Child Benefit Supplement examined here is designed primarily to replace 
Child Dependant Additions. It will also replace some element of FIS payments, 
with the exact extent depending on the parameters of the scheme. An example 
using round numbers may help to clarify. If the FIS income limit for a one child 
family were €400 per week, and the family’s income was €300 per week, then the 
FIS entitlement would be €60 per week. Now suppose a Child Benefit Supplement 
of €20 per week is introduced. The FIS entitlement falls to €48 per week, a 
reduction of €12 per week, or 60 per cent of the amount of the Child Benefit 
Supplement. 
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receive it. The UK experience with tax credits suggests that this is 
not easily achieved. The House of Commons Treasury Committee 
(2006) noted that about one-third of all tax credit awards were 
overpaid, at an average cost per case of about UK£1,000. 
A useful point of comparison can be provided by examining 
what the existing income support structure would achieve, if perfect 
take-up of benefit could be guaranteed. Our analysis finds moving 
from low take up to full take up of FIS would lead to a 3 percentage 
point reduction in the key “at risk of poverty” indicator. Thus, while 
CBS involves more than just changes in take-up, a key element of its 
impact in poverty reduction comes from the assumed full take-up. 
Achieving full take-up, and avoiding overpayments and reclaiming of 
payment, as in the UK experience, would be vital to the success of 
the scheme. 
 
 There are strong links between child income poverty and the 
overall “at risk of poverty”. In particular, the countries with the best 
record on the reduction of child poverty – the Scandinavian 
countries – also tend to have the lowest rates of overall poverty. The 
“best practice” approach to improving EU performance in this area 
suggests close attention should be given to the policies and 
structures of the best-performing countries. The logic of the 
approach is therefore that other countries should compare their 
approaches with those of the Scandinavian countries – which are the 
best performers in this regard not only in Europe but in global 
terms. 
4. 
Conclusion
By contrast, much of the debate on child poverty has focused on 
restructuring income-tested income support for families with 
children, with attention centering on recent initiatives in English-
speaking countries. While some reductions in poverty have been 
achieved by these initiatives, it is clear that rates of child income 
poverty in the English speaking countries remain well above those in 
most European countries, and well above Scandinavian levels. 
This approach is associated with a tendency to view child poverty 
as a problem to be dealt with, in the main, through child income 
support. The problem with this is that children are not poor on their 
own – they have a parent or parents living in poverty with them. So 
avoidance of poverty requires that parents have adequate incomes 
too. As Sutherland (2005) puts it: 
One feature of the “successful” countries in Europe is that 
relatively large parts of their benefit systems are not child-
contingent but nevertheless succeed in keeping children as well 
as adults out of poverty. Sutherland (2005, p.32) 
Tackling child income poverty requires a strategy that takes a 
broad view of welfare income supports, and “activist” measures to 
increase participation in employment. Solutions lie not with welfare 
alone, or employment alone, but a combination of both. 
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STATE  FINANCIAL 
SUPPORT FOR HORSE 
RACING IN IRELAND  
Tony Fahey and Liam Delaney   
 The Horse and Greyhound Racing Fund, set up under the Horse 
and Greyhound Racing Act 2001, provides a substantial scheme of 
state support for the horse and greyhound racing industries in 
Ireland. Between 2001 and 2006, €396 million of public funds has 
been provided to these industries, divided in the ratio of 80 per cent 
(€317 million) to horse racing and 20 per cent (€79 million) to 
greyhound racing. The government is committed to continuing 
funding at a similar level up to 2008. No decisions in regard to the 
Fund have been made for the period after 2008, and the questions 
of whether, at what levels and through what means state funding for 
these industries should continue after 2008 will soon need to be 
addressed by policy makers.  
1. 
Introduction
This paper focuses on the larger of the two strands of subsidy 
supported by the Fund, that provided to horse racing, and identifies 
some of the issues that need to be considered in thinking about its 
future post 2008. By some measures, the level of state support for 
horse racing is generous: the amount provided in 2005 – €54.68 
million – was the equivalent of €38 for each of the 1.43 million 
attendances at race meetings. Averaged over race meetings rather 
than attendances, the subsidy was €179,000 per meeting. Based on 
Indecon’s (2004) estimates of employment in horse racing, the 
annual subsidy is the equivalent of about €7,100 per job in the 
sector.1 This funding is separate from and additional to the tax 
subsidy to horse breeding provided by the stallion fees income tax 
exemption scheme introduced in 1969. The latter scheme is often 
39 
 
1 “For the horse racing, training and betting sectors, it is estimated that the numbers 
of persons employed as jockeys, trainers and stable yard staff equals 3,375 persons. 
There is an estimated 1,600 persons employed (including part-time employment) at 
race meetings and in the running and maintenance of racecourses. This excludes 
indirect employment in ancilliary services which is estimated to be 2,700” (Indecon, 
2004, p. ii). Direct and indirect full-time and part-time employment in the sector 
thus amounts to 7,675 persons, according to this estimate.   
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credited with turning Ireland into a world leader in the breeding and 
export of thoroughbred horses (Indecon, 2004).2 While breeding 
and racing are parts of a single thoroughbred horse industry, the 
racing component is sufficiently distinct in structure and in regard to 
the supports it receives from the state for it to be treated as 
analytically distinct from the other components. That is the 
approach that we adopt here.  
In examining this issue, our objective is not to provide a detailed 
technical assessment of the impact of or justification for public 
subsidy to horse racing. Rather, in the context of the forthcoming 
decisions that will need to be made regarding the future of the 
Horse and Greyhound Racing Fund, the objective is to outline the 
background to and major features of the Fund and open up some of 
the questions that need to be examined in considering what should 
happen after 2008. Many of the issues that arise in relation to 
supports for horse racing from the Fund could apply equally to 
greyhound racing and could be dealt with in similar terms. However, 
greyhound racing is sufficiently different in scale, in the level of 
subsidy it receives and in its social and economic significance for it 
to warrant separate treatment, and so we do not deal with it here.  
 
 The issues that arise in relation to state subsidy for horse racing 
under the Horse and Greyhound Racing Fund concern not only the 
expenditure side – the amount of subsidy provided and what it is 
spent on – but also the revenue side, that is, the manner in which 
the subsidy is financed. In fact, in some respects questions about the 
revenue side could be said to be central, for reasons that reflect 
features of the horse racing industry that are not present in the same 
way in other areas of commercial activity (other than greyhound 
racing) in which the state might intervene. This is so because horse 
racing, like greyhound racing, is faced with a distinctive free rider 
problem (no pun intended). Its most valuable commercial product is 
the colourful and attractive outlet it provides for gambling. In 
contrast with other sports, most people who go to race meetings or 
watch races on television do not do so simply out of interest in the 
sport or to support individual participants but because they like to 
back horses and see if their horses win. In Ireland in 2005, the total 
gambling market has been estimated to be worth almost €2.6 billion, 
consisting of €2.3 billion in off-course betting (which includes 
betting on horse racing and many other activities) and €0.28 billion 
in on-course betting (Horse Racing Ireland, 2005). While it is not 
known how much of the total gambling market was accounted for 
by betting on horse racing, it is likely to have been the single most 
important sector.  
2. 
The Issues 
2 Tax incentive schemes for horse racing in Ireland include the direct tax exemption 
for stallion fees and reduced VAT rates in a number of aspects of equine care. 
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The problem for the racing industry is that in countries such as 
Ireland and Britain with a relatively free market in betting,3 much 
gambling is run by bookmakers and betting companies that are 
independent of the producers of racing and can use their product 
without having to provide a return to the racing industry. This 
problem arises most clearly in the case of off-course betting, where 
most gambling takes place, since such activity is to a large degree 
structurally separate from the production of racing (and is further 
complicated by growing presence of gambling on activities other 
than horse racing – see further below). The problem of extracting a 
return for the racing industry extends to some degree also to on-
course betting since the charges that racecourses can impose on on-
course gambling are constrained by the competitive disadvantages 
that could result in comparison to off-course betting. One of the key 
roles that the racing industry in countries with free markets in betting calls upon 
the state to carry out is to devise and enforce means to overcome this free rider 
problem. The objective is to make gambling on racing (both on-
course and off-course) yield a return to the suppliers of racing and 
thus help sustain the commercial viability of the racing industry. 
This demand typically arises in the context of broader fiscal policy 
where gambling is often looked to as a source of tax revenue, 
whether in the form of expenditure taxes on betting or company 
taxes on bookmaking firms, and where both the racing and gambling 
industries seek to minimise these burdens.  
A further important contextual issue is that, while horse racing 
has traditionally been one of the most popular outlets for gambling, 
the gambling industry is itself becoming more diverse, particularly 
with the rise of internet gambling and the growing role of gambling 
on other sports (such as soccer) and on internet poker, on-line slot 
machines and virtual racing (on the situation in Britain, with 
comparisons to Australia and the United States, see Paton et al., 
2002). One effect of these new forms of gambling has been to cause 
the gambling market to mushroom, though often by means that yet 
lack a clear regulatory or fiscal framework. They also give rise to a 
new level of competition between traditional and novel gambling 
outlets, between domestic and off-shore gambling, and between 
large gambling multiples and local bookmakers. These competitive 
pressures have to be taken into account in considering fiscal policy 
on gambling in Ireland, since the imposition of taxes or charges on 
any one form of gambling could in theory cause a flight to other 
forms of gambling or to gambling providers outside of Irish tax 
jurisdiction. It must be emphasised that we have no information on 
precisely how sensitive the Irish gambling market is to such 
pressures or what difference the growing availability of internet 
3 In many of the continental EU countries, gambling is a state monopoly or is 
permitted in the private sector only under tight restrictions. Gambling legislation in 
a number of these countries is currently under investigation by the European 
Commission because of possible conflict with EU rules on the free movement of 
services across state borders. 
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gambling makes in this regard. Nevertheless, it is evident that one of the key 
questions for future policy on state support for horse racing concerns the sensitivity 
of the gambling consumer to tax-related costs of gambling and his or her 
behavioural responses to different forms and levels of taxation on the various 
outlets for gambling in Ireland. There is a more general question about 
the stance that public policy should adopt in regard to gambling. At 
present, policy on horse racing is committed to expansion of the 
gambling market, and public funds provided to the horse racing 
industry support that goal. However, gambling has social costs and 
these have to be taken into account in deciding whether present 
policy needs to be assessed in the light of broader social concerns 
about gambling. In Ireland as in Britain, there has been relatively 
little controversy on this aspect of gambling (in contrast, for 
example, to the United States, where religiously-based objections to 
gambling have often exercised some influence on policy – Paton et 
al., 2002). 
A further issue that lies in the background to the role of 
gambling in horse racing is that horse racing is expensive to mount 
and is at a particular disadvantage in this regard compared to the 
newer electronic forms of gambling where production costs can be 
very low. While the purchase, export and import, training and racing 
of thoroughbreds on behalf of (mainly wealthy) owners is an 
important element of the commercial viability of the overall 
thoroughbred industry, that element on its own, in the absence of 
revenues from betting, would not be enough to sustain the horse 
racing sector of the industry, at least not at the level found in Ireland 
at present. At the same time, horse racing has positive social and 
economic externalities that give it a value independent of its role in 
gambling: as we consider further below, it is a significant element of 
the rural economy in many parts of Ireland, it plays some role in the 
tourism market, it is an important entertainment outlet for Irish 
people, and many would regard it as an important social and cultural 
element of Irish life. To say that it has a value in these areas, 
however, is not to imply that the positive externalities in question 
warrant state support or would fail to be provided to an adequate 
level in the absence of state funding. Therefore, arguments 
concerning the social or economic value of horse racing do not 
automatically provide a justification for current state subsidy for the 
industry. 
 
 Horse racing has long been a significant industry and an 
important part of sporting and entertainment life in Ireland. 
However, by the mid-1990s, although horse breeding was thriving, 
there were concerns that the racing side of the industry was in some 
difficulty. Revenues at racecourses were felt to be insufficient to 
cover operating costs and provide a surplus for necessary investment 
in racecourse grounds and facilities, betting and broadcasting 
technology, and activities needed to attract greater attendances. This 
viewpoint was set out in the strategic plan for the period 1997-2001 
drawn up in 1996 by the Irish Horseracing Authority (IHA), the 
3. 
Horse Racing 
Pre-2001
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statutory body that, along with the Irish Turf Club, was then 
responsible for the administration and development of horse racing 
(IHA, 1996). Ireland had a large number of racecourses for a 
country of its size (25, compared to 58 in England) but according to 
the IHA many of these were in a poor condition and were operating 
at the margins of profitability. Prize money for races was also said to 
be low. An international study quoted by the IHA estimated that 
share of the cost of keeping and training racehorses covered by 
prize-money was lower in Ireland (at 20 per cent) than in any other 
major racing nation (the corresponding proportion in the UK was 
also low, at 21 per cent, but it was higher in other countries, e.g. 35 
per cent in Australia, 47 per cent in the USA, and 143 per cent in 
Hong Kong  – IHA, 1996, p. 15). A key problem identified by the 
IHA was that the Irish racing industry had no mechanism for 
generating revenue from off-course betting, a situation that it 
claimed was unique in the international racing world. Instead, it 
received the proceeds of a 5 per cent levy imposed on on-course 
betting, which amounted to IR£3.7 million in 1996. Tote betting, a 
major source of revenue for racing in many countries, was also said 
to be inefficiently run and produced too little of a surplus to make a 
worthwhile financial contribution to the industry. The IHA received 
an annual government grant which in 1996 amounted to IR£7 
million and which was used primarily as a contribution to prize 
money. However, the IHA pointed out that government taxation on 
off-course betting (which then stood at 10 per cent) yielded revenue 
to the state that was about five times greater than the state’s grants 
to the industry (IHA, 1996, p. 14). 
As the 1990s progressed, government support for horse racing 
steadily increased and by 1998 a new and more generous funding 
regime was promised, subject to organisational reform of the 
industry and coupled with a lightening of the tax burden on betting. 
The key organisational reform that was sought was the creation of a 
single governing body that would unite the functions of the IHA 
and the Turf Club. The government abolished the on-course betting 
levy of 5 per cent in 1999 and increased the state grant to the IHA 
to compensate for the resulting loss of revenue. It also reduced the 
off-course betting tax from 10 per cent to 5 per cent. At the same 
time, it imposed an 0.3 per cent levy on bookmaker turnover and a 
fixed contribution of IR£2,000 per bookmaker as a revenue source 
for the IHA (IHA Annual Report, 1999, p. 9). By 2000, the state grant 
to the IHA had increased to IR£18 million and state-backed revenue 
to the IHA levied from bookmakers amounted to IR£4.4 million, 
which meant that state-backed funding to the industry had more 
than doubled since 1995.  
 
 The enactment of the Horse and Greyhound Racing Act, 2001 
completed the transition to a new funding and regulatory regime. 
The unified governing body that had been sought for horse racing as 
part of the process of reform came to pass through the setting up of 
Horse Racing Ireland under this legislation. Equally important was 
4. 
Post-2001
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both the more generous level and the guaranteed multi-annual 
nature of the new state funding arrangement, which as already 
indicated encompassed greyhound as well as horse racing. For Horse 
Racing Ireland, the state grant received in 2002 under this new 
legislation amounted to €47 million, a very large increase on 
previous funding levels. In 2004, the arrangement was extended up 
to 2008, on the same basis as that set out in the original proposal. 
The biggest use to which the state grant to HRI is put is as a 
contribution to prize money. In 2005, the HRI contribution to prize 
money for horse racing was €29.9 million, which represented 58 per 
cent of the total prize fund for horse racing and was the equivalent 
of 55 per cent of the state grant to HRI in that year. (Horse Racing 
Ireland, 2005, p. 49). 
The Horse and Greyhound Racing Fund as originally set up was 
a direct response by the state to a demand from the Irish racing 
industry that it be allotted a share of the proceeds of gambling (for a 
statement of the racing industry’s case in this regard, see the 
Strategic Plan of the Irish Horseracing Authority published in 1996 
– IHA, 1996).  The grants to the industry that the Fund provided for 
were initially intended to be financed primarily by a tax on betting, 
which at the outset took the form of the 5 per cent excise on off-
course betting already in place when the legislation was introduced. 
No attempt was made to distinguish between off-course betting on 
horse or dog racing and other types of gambling that occurred with 
off-course bookmakers. The annual value of the Fund was fixed at 
the level equivalent to the revenue from the excise on off-course 
betting for the year 2000, adjusted in subsequent years for inflation 
as measured by the consumer price index. Measures to increase the 
yield to racing from on-course betting were also taken at the same 
time, particularly in regard to modernisation of the Tote.4 However, 
the legislation of 2001 went a crucial step further, in that it also 
made provision for top-up financing from general Exchequer 
sources to be provided to the Horse and Greyhound Racing Fund 
should the betting levy prove to be an insufficient funding source on 
its own. This top-up provision was subsequently brought very much 
into play, as the levy on off-course betting was reduced to 2 per cent 
in 2002 and to 1 per cent in 2006. This meant in effect that the horse 
and greyhound racing industries were insulated from the 
consequences of any fall in revenue from the excise on off-course 
betting, irrespective of whether that fall occurred either because of a 
decline in the level of off-course betting (for whatever reason) or a 
reduction in the rate of excise levied on betting. 
The table below shows the expenditure from the Horse and 
Greyhound Fund since 2001 and the balance between the excise on 
4 Details of the current Tote system are available at www.tote.ie. The Tote operates 
on-course and on-line betting on a pooled principle whereby dividends paid out 
depend on the distribution of bets placed rather than a price fixed in advance. Tote 
Ireland is a subsidiary of Horse Racing Ireland and, as such, contributes to the 
revenue generated by HRI for the support of horse racing.  
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off-course betting and general Exchequer subvention as income 
sources for the Fund. For the first two years, the excise on its own 
provided the full income, as had been originally expected. In fact, 
the excise income exceeded the Fund’s requirement (it amounted to 
€68.06 million in 2002, up from €58.89 million in 2001) and the 
balance was treated as general Exchequer revenue. With the 
reduction in the excise rate from 5 per cent to 2 per cent in 2002, 
excise income fell to 75 per cent of the Fund’s requirement in 2003 
and to 57 per cent in 2004. Exchequer subventions of €16.24 million 
and €28.49 million were provided in those years. Rapid growth in 
gambling caused the excise income to rise in 2005, and it is likely to 
rise further in 2006, though perhaps not quite enough to amount to 
100 per cent of the Fund’s requirement. However, the further 
reduction in the betting excise rate to 1 per cent in 2006 will cause 
the excise income to the Fund to fall again in 2007, so that the 
Exchequer subvention will become quite large again until current 
government commitments to the Fund terminate in 2008. 
Horse and Greyhound Racing Fund: Expenditure and Income Sources 
Fund Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Total 
 € million 
Fund Expenditure 58.89 68.06 64.19 66.91 68.35 70.06 396.46 
Horse racing 47.12 54.45 51.35 53.53 54.68 56.05 317.18 
Greyhound racing 11.77 13.61 12.84m 13.38 13.67 14.01 79.28 
Excise Income* 58.89 68.06 47.95 38.42 45.55 n.a.  
Exchequer Income** Nil Nil 16.24 28.49m 22.80 n.a.  
% provided by Excise 100% 100% 75% 57% 67% n.a.  
* Excise duty on off-course betting from previous year. 
** Balance provided from general Exchequer. 
Source: Department of Arts, Sport and Tourism. 
 
The outcome by 2006, therefore, was that the original function 
of the Horse and Greyhound Racing Fund as a means to capture 
some of the return from off-course gambling for the racing industry 
had declined in significance and had been supplemented with a new 
and largely unheralded function as a channel of direct state aid to the 
industry. At the same time, the level of taxes and levies on gambling 
had been sharply reduced. The 10 per cent excise on off-course 
betting, which went into general state revenue, and 5 per cent levy 
on on-course betting imposed for the benefit of the racing industry 
which had existed in 1995 were replaced in 2006 with a 1 per cent 
excise on off-course betting, which was ear-marked for the Horse 
and Greyhound Racing Fund, and zero taxes or levies on on-course 
betting. The tax burden on betting had thus become extremely light 
by 2006. The racing and gambling industries had been a net 
contributor to state finances in 1995 – state revenue from gambling 
exceeded the value of state grants to racing fivefold, as the IHA 
pointed out at that time (IHA, 1996, p. 14). Today, the racing and 
gambling industries combined are a net drain on public finances, 
since as just outlined the sole state revenue stream from these 
sources – the excise on off-course betting – is insufficient to meet 
the state’s commitment to the Horse and Greyhound Racing Fund.   
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 While it is not possible in the present paper to isolate the 
contribution of increased state funding to the development of the 
horse racing industry over the past decade, it is possible to trace the 
broad outlines of the industry’s development. There are currently 27 
horse racing tracks in Ireland (including 2 in Northern Ireland), the 
same number as in 1995.5 This compares to 58 tracks in Britain. 
Indecon (2004, p. 68) estimated that employment in horse racing in 
2003 amounted to 5,000 direct and 2,700 indirect jobs. On-course 
and off-course betting provided 4,200 jobs, many of which were 
casual or part-time in nature.  
5. 
Industry 
Performance 
The numbers of fixtures and levels of attendance at race meeting 
have increased in recent years, doubtlessly in part because of 
increased state funding. The number of fixtures rose from 258 in 
1996 to 303 in 2003 (Indecon 2004, p. 55), with the 2005 annual 
report of HRI showing 313 fixtures. Attendances at race meetings 
rose from 1.1 million in 1996 to 1.4 million in 2003. Total betting 
doubled between 1997 and 2003, with a particularly sharp rise (232 
per cent) in off-course betting, which amounted to almost €2 billion 
in 2003 (Indecon 2004).  
 
 Up until 2001, state regulation and support for the horse racing 
industry came under the umbrella of the Department of Agriculture 
but then was transferred to the Department of Arts, Sport and 
Tourism, where it was administered under a sports heading. In 
evaluating to rationale for state support for industry, either or both 
of these policy contexts could be considered as relevant. This 
complicates the task of analysing the policy case for state funding for 
the industry.  
6. 
Policy Context
Looking first at the sports policy, it is clear that in this context 
state funding for horse racing appears both lavish in extent and weak 
in justification. The total sports budget of the Department of Arts, 
Sports and Tourism in 2005 was approximately €190 million, of 
which over one-third (€68 million) was accounted for by 
expenditure from the Horse and Greyhound Racing Fund (of this, 
the €54.7 million provided to horse racing accounted for 29 per cent 
of the Department’s total sports budget). This is in a context where 
the Department provides financial assistance to over 60 sporting 
bodies, the current element of which (excluding the Horse and 
Greyhound Racing Fund) is administered through the Irish Sports 
Council and the capital element directly by the Department. Current 
funding for horse racing on its own exceeded the total budget of Irish Sports 
Council and thus exceeded the current funding for all of the 60-plus sports bodies 
5 The tracks are Killarney, Tralee, Listowel, Cork, Tramore, Clonmel, Tipperary, 
Thurles, Limerick, Tramore, Wexford, Gowran Park, Curragh, Punchestown, Naas, 
Galway, Ballinrobe, Leopardstown, Punchestown, Naas, Kilbeggen, Fairyhouse, 
Bellewstown, Laytown, Navan, Roscommon, Sligo, Dundalk, Down Royal and 
Downpatrick. 
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combined that it deals with. The distribution of the capital budget was 
more balanced in that it was distributed widely across sports bodies 
and the capital element of the funds provided to horse racing were 
not disproportionately large.  
The impression of imbalance from a sports policy perspective in 
the extent of funding provided to horse racing is added to when one 
considers that horse racing makes only a limited contribution to the 
objectives of sports policy. These objectives relate to a number of 
socially valuable outcomes, including in particular the promotion of 
physical activity in the population and support for volunteering and 
other community activity centred on sports clubs (Delaney and 
Fahey, 2005). Public support and following for teams or individuals 
competing in local, national and international events are also 
important dimensions of social life and a major basis for the 
formation and expression of collective identity in modern societies. 
While horse racing undoubtedly has strong social aspects, its makes 
little or no contribution either to physical activity or volunteerism in 
sport. It thus is not entirely irrelevant to the concerns of sports 
policy but nevertheless cannot claim the kind of centrality for those 
concerns that would justify the especially generous level of sports 
funding it receives.  
State support for horse and greyhound racing was originally a 
function of the Department of Agriculture and reflects the relevance 
of these industries to the rural economy.  Its role in generating 
domestic and foreign tourism business through race meetings is one 
mechanism by which that contribution can be made. Direct 
employment in the industry is another. As already mentioned, 
approximately 7,600 people (including part-time staff) are employed 
in horse racing and ancillary industries in Ireland. On these grounds, 
an argument might be made for the support of horse racing as a 
form of support for rural employment and economic activity, 
though here again some justification (for example, in relation to 
market failure) would need to be provided to make such an 
argument stand up.  
However, a number of factors reduces the efficiency of horse 
racing as a vehicle for rural development. Race meetings are sporadic 
even in the largest venues. Furthermore, much employment in the 
industry is low skilled and has little scope for the kind of 
productivity enhancement that increases prosperity. Even within the 
industry, there is some acceptance that the economic rationale for 
financing 27 racecourses through the country may be suspect:  
A number of Irish racecourses which were previously 
located in rural areas are now on the outskirts of large towns 
and consequently their land has become significantly more 
valuable. On strictly commercial lines there is a case for a 
reduction in the number of racecourses and it is likely that 
economic forces will dictate this in some cases (Horse 
Racing Ireland, 2003).  
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 Horse racing receives significant public funding in Ireland, 
amounting to the equivalent of €38 per person attending a horse 
race meeting in 2005. This paper has sought to identify and highlight 
a number of issues that need to be considered in deciding the future 
of this funding after current government commitments to the 
industry run out in 2008. (Public funding is also provided on a 
similar basis to greyhound racing, but the level of funding and the 
issues that arise in connection with greyhound racing are sufficiently 
different to warrant separate treatment and are not dealt with here.) 
Horse racing has a social, economic and cultural place in Irish life 
that can be pointed in justifying a positive policy stance towards the 
industry. It is not self-evident, however, that such a policy stance 
should extend to the provision of public funding nor, if public 
funding is justified, does it dictate the level of support that is 
required nor the means through which it should be provided.  
7. 
Conclusions 
The case for state financial support for horse racing has most 
often been made in connection with the distinctive free rider 
problem facing the industry: it has difficulty extracting a return from 
its most important commercial product, namely the opportunities it 
provides for gambling. The primary beneficiary from this product is 
the betting rather than the racing industry, a pattern that arises 
particularly in the case of off-course betting where most gambling 
on horse racing takes place (although much off-course betting now 
goes beyond horse racing, or even dog racing, in view of the growth 
in betting on other sports and on a wide range of internet gambling 
activities). The present system of state funding for horse racing was 
originally interpreted as a state-backed means to secure a return 
from off-course betting, since it was initially intended to be financed 
by means of an excise duty on off-course betting and for a time was 
in fact fully financed from that source. However, the excise on 
betting has been reduced over recent years, to the point where it no 
longer is sufficient to fund state financial support for the racing 
industry and has to be supplemented by general Exchequer funding. 
The reduction in excise on off-course betting has occurred mainly 
because competition from internet gambling has made it increasingly 
difficult to tax all forms of gambling and thus enables gambling to 
escape the reach not only of the racing industry but also of the state. 
Thus state funding for horse racing in Ireland now goes beyond 
the role of securing a benefit from gambling for the industry as it 
includes subvention from general taxation. This intensifies the 
questions that arise about the justification for state funding, 
particularly at the high levels that have been in place in recent years. 
These doubts arise, for example, in the context of wider sports 
policy, where other claims on state funding could equally be made 
(e.g. in connection with the facilities deficit that exists for children’s 
sport – see Fahey et al., 2005), apart from other priorities for state 
expenditure that might arise outside the sports arena. At a minimum, 
future policy in this area will have to assess carefully the public 
benefit that is served by state support for horse racing and the 
priority it should be accorded in public expenditure decisions. 
    STATE FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR HORSE RACING IN IRELAND 49 
 
Two other more general issues need also to be considered as part 
of this assessment. First, public policy should take greater account of 
the role of horse racing in promoting gambling and in the possible 
social costs of gambling that may arise as a result. Second, in many 
countries, gambling is a significant part of the public revenue base, 
either through taxation on gambling or the returns of state 
monopolies on gambling. Apart from Lotto revenue, gambling in 
Ireland makes little contribution in that context and the question 
should be considered as to whether this should continue in the 
future, even in view of the rise of internet gambling and the 
difficulties that poses for collecting tax revenue from gambling. 
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